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Abstract
This report focus on the potential use of domestic transferable permit (TPs) systems in
the transport sector, in order to address the issue of mobility needs management and
especially the reductions of airborne pollution and greenhouse gas emissions. Firstly
the context of the transport sector is briefly reviewed, the main arguments for or
against the use of TPs in the sector are analysed and relevant areas are identified.
Secondly four case studies of past, present or possible future permits systems are
presented and evaluated. The main conclusions are: TPs applied to mobile sources are
technically feasible at acceptable financial costs for protecting sensitive geographic
areas. TPs schemes applied to automakers for unit vehicle emissions are also viable.
Clarity, simplicity in target and pragmatism in scheme design help for their success.
Regarding the broader GHG issue end-user TPs would currently involve significant
administrative costs when compared with fuel tax system. Given the social resistance
encountered by increase in fuel taxes in several countries, end-user TPs with free
allocation may intrinsically have potential greater effectiveness and acceptance and
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“There is a clear understanding that we cannot provide for the world’s continuing and
growing needs for mobility by simply extending today’s means of transportation.”
1
Clearly today mobility is part of the whole sustainable development issue: that is to
say how can we meet the needs of today without diminishing the capacity of future
generations to meet theirs? 
Maintaining a sustainable mobility means to continuously assess and drive efficiently
its different aspects for now and the future: that is to say economic (e.g. achieve a
better balance between demand and supply), financial (e.g. finance transport
infrastructure and operation), environmental (e.g. avoid harmful health effects) and
social aspects (e.g. maintain spatial and social cohesion).
There are already numerous studies about the way transport activity could be made
more sustainable. ECMT (1997) has conducted a detailed review of the available
policy options to reduce overall CO2 emissions of the transport sector. With its
Environmentally Sustainable Transport (EST) program, OECD has recently achieved
a thorough analysis of possible scenarios to make transport environmentally
sustainable for 2030 and elaborated related packages of measures (OECD, 2000b).
The business side (World Business Council for Sustainable Development) is also
undertaking a sustainable mobility initiative (WBCSD, 2001)
Within the wide range of policy instruments Transferable Permits (TPs) are currently
attracting growing interest in OECD Member countries. In both theory and practice,
the main strength of applying TPs has been for larger point sources for air and water
pollution, while smaller or non-point sources have been better addressed through
taxes.  Given that transport sector is increasingly becoming the major source of air
pollution as well as greenhouse gases, the possibility of applying TPs to non-point
sources is worth exploring. 
One strong conclusion of the studies on transport emissions reduction strategies is that
these strategies should involve multiple technological, economic and societal aspects,
thus meaning a package of instruments within a proper implementation. With this
respect, the focus of this report is much more limited and is on the potential use of
domestic transferable permit systems in the transport sector. It aims at answering the
question of potentials of TPs to address the issue of mobility needs management and
especially the reductions of airborne pollution and greenhouse gas emissions
stemming from transport. The analysis will be conducted both on a general level and
on the basis of a few case studies.
The first section reviews the context of the transport sector and, in particular, the
environmental problems posed by transport activities.  The main arguments a priori
for or against the use of transferable permits are analysed and areas where they might
be used within the transport sector are identified.










































The second section presents four case studies of past, present or possible future
systems and analyses their potential.
The third and final section concludes by drawing common lessons from these case
studies and by identifying the avenues which remain to be explored.
1.  THE TRANSPORTATION SECTOR CONTEXT
The transportation sector, understood as embracing all infrastructure and services that
allow for the movement of people and goods, is key to the economic and social
functioning of modern societies.
These societies have only been able to grow because of accelerating economic and
social interaction and exchange.  The transportation system has grown apace with
political transformations (the creation of unified nation States, the abolition of internal
customs barriers, safer highway networks) and has benefited from technical and
economic innovations: creation of highway, rail, air and river infrastructure,
development and wide use of internal combustion engines.  Transport has in fact been
an essential vector of economic and social development, and will surely be called
upon to continue as such.
In the course of achieving these general objectives, the transportation system is now
subject to a number of major constraints, given the current state of its technologies:
these constraints relate to concerns over energy dependence, the global environment,
the local environment and quality of life, the shortage of available space in densely
populated areas, and the ensuing congestion, and finally the scarcity of public
funding.  This paper will confine itself to the environmental aspects, while bearing in
mind the other constraints that also impact on any policy for controlling the
transportation system.
1.1.  The global environment and the greenhouse effect
The global environmental constraint is becoming increasingly severe, and concern is
rising, in particular, over the potential for global climate change caused by human
activities.  At the centre of these concerns is the greenhouse effect, with its associated
gases (carbon dioxide CO2, methane CH4, nitrous oxide N2O, and also tropospheric
ozone
2 O 3 via its precursors, notably nitrogen oxides, carbon monoxide, CH4 and
non-methane hydrocarbon) a great part of them resulting from the combustion of
fossil fuels.  To these we must add chlorofluorocarbons (CFC) released by air
conditioners, particularly during the automobile wrecking process: these pollutants
can persist for more than two centuries in the upper atmosphere.  While the nature and
scope of their effects are still the subject of debate, the stakes are such that, in
accordance with the precautionary principle, ways should be found to reduce
                                                
2 However tropospheric ozone is not recognised by the UNFCCC as a greenhouse gas, since significant









































emissions of these gases, as well as the consumption of fossil fuels in the
transportation sector.
Following the 1992 Rio conference (UNFCCC), which adopted the principle of an
international agreement to reduce greenhouse gases emissions at least by half,
industrialised countries (known as the "Annex I Countries" under the protocol) agreed
in 1997 at Kyoto on a protocol for limiting emissions over a horizon extending to
2010, but with a more limited target of average –5% compared with 1990.  Every
Annex I country committed itself to the limitation target.
In most industrialised countries the transport sector is one of the most significant
GHG emitter and particularly of CO2, the main greenhouse gas associated to transport
activity (for instance 34% of CO2 in France
3 in 1999, 30% of CO2 in the US in 1997).
However the biggest threat is that the rate of growth in CO2 emissions from the
transport sector is projected to outstrip that for the other sectors in most countries, so
the share of CO2 emissions from the transport sector is expected to be even greater in
the future. According to the OECD transport is the second highest growth sectors in
terms of GHG emissions in the OECD area (following industrial processes), with the
share of CO2 emissions increasing from about 25% in 1995 to 30% in 2020 (OECD,
2000a). Within the European Union, it is expected in a recent study (Bates et al, 2001)
that the growth from 1990 to 2010 in the CO2 emissions from transport in the EU
would be 35% in the baseline trend and 25% taking into account the full effect of the
voluntary agreement with the car makers
4. This result should be related to the Kyoto
objective of –8% for the EU.
According to the OECD (1995), forecast traffic growth (in vehicle kilometres
travelled, VKT) is such that current strategies for reducing unit vehicle emissions will
be inadequate to reduce overall emissions.  Only with more intensive application of a
combination of technical solutions for reducing emissions, enhancing the energy
efficiency of engines and slowing the growth of VKT will it be possible to reduce
greenhouse emissions over the coming 30 to 40 years.
1.2.  The local environment and its impact on daily life
The local environmental constraint relates to localised emissions of atmospheric
pollutants, as well as to transportation noise and safety concerns.
Local and regional airborne pollutants
The principal atmospheric pollutants produced by automobile traffic (OECD, 1995,
2000b) are:
                                                
3 CITEPA, 2000
4  Known as the “ACEA-EU agreement” it is a voluntary agreement between EU and European
(ACEA), and then Japanese (JAMA) and Korean (KAMA) car manufacturers to reduce the average









































•  Carbon monoxide (CO) which, as a haemoglobin oxidant, hinders oxygen
transport in the body; the short term limits set by the WHO are often exceeded (in
one-half of the world’s cities, according to the United Nations).  
•  Volatile organic compounds (VOC), including benzene, 1:3 butadiene,
formaldehyde, acetaldehyde and polynuclear aromatic hydrocarbons; these result
from the incomplete combustion of fuels and from evaporation losses during the
fuel distribution, storage and transport cycle.  They are for the most part highly
carcinogenic.  According to the USEPA (the USA's Environmental Protection
Agency), mobile sources may account for 54 percent to 58 percent of cancers
associated with toxic air pollutants in the USA.  
•  Nitrogen oxides (NOx), which are the second cause of acid rain after sulphur
dioxide and are among the precursors of tropospheric ozone or smog, together
with VOC; they provoke respiratory problems, particularly in children (coughs,
rhinitis, sore throats) and increase the sensitivity of asthma sufferers to urban dust
and pollen.  
•  Sulphur dioxide (SO2), released primarily by diesel fuel, is a contributor to acid
rain and also to respiratory irritation.  
•  Particulate matter (PM), which include dust, dirt, soot, smoke, and liquid droplets.
They are emitted directly, for instance resulting from the incomplete combustion
of diesel fuel, or formed by condensation or transformation of emitted gases such
as SO2, NOx, and VOC into tiny droplets. Fine particles (PM10 of a diameter less
than 10 microns) are the most readily inhalable. These substances also produce
respiratory problems, and are probably carcinogenic. Gasoline releases fewer
particles, but they are more highly toxic.  
•  Lead as a gasoline additive; this has harmful effects on health, even in extremely
low concentrations (behavioural problems, difficulty in concentrating, low IQ); it
is widely dispersed through exhaust emissions, but is now gradually disappearing
in most OECD countries
5.  
•  Other pollutants, such as asbestos, use of which is to be reduced in any case (brake
pads, clutches, automatic transmissions), toxic heavy metals, and dioxins, which
are present in infinitesimal quantities but pose a grave risk when accumulated.
It is important to appreciate the complexity of the mixtures of chemical compounds
that, under the effect of solar radiation for example, produce photochemical fogs or
smog (tropospheric ozone, a harmful irritant, in contrast to stratospheric ozone, which
provides protection against ultraviolet radiation).
This atmospheric pollution is worse in urbanised areas with features such as
unfavourable topography (e.g. mountainous basins) or meteorology (e.g. thermal
inversions) which prevent dispersion of pollutants. The improvements made in fuel
quality and vehicle emission standards in most OECD countries tend to lower the
trend of total emissions of these kind of pollutants (for instance in the USA
6 or in the
European Union
7). However the continuous and fast growth of VKT tends to offset
the optimist projections in these countries while the rapidly growing use of old and
less compliant vehicles in developing countries (e.g. in Latin America) is a major
source of high-level air pollution in urbanised areas of the developing world (Onursal
                                                
5 Cf. the discussion of the gasoline lead phase-out program in the United States, below.
6 see the ZEV case study below









































and Gautam, 1997). The OECD projections to 2030 confirms the continuation of the
decline of traffic-related local pollution in the OECD area (OECD, 2000b) while in
the rest of the world this pollution should increase.
A technology dilemma? 
While the generalisation of catalytic converter is an adequate answer to the
local/regional pollution problem, this is not the case for CO2 emissions. Of course
reductions in unit vehicle emissions or consumption can still be achieved while
battery electric vehicles are developed for introduction to the market within the next
10 years to address this issue of local/regional pollution
8. However this last solution is
criticised from the point of view of both CO2 emissions, depending on the way
electricity is produced, and waste recycling or stocking, whether considering batteries
or nuclear power.
This dilemma could resolve by considering the longer term perspective of CO2
emissions reduction. As underlined in the EST study (OECD, 2000b) if the CO2 target
is met, mostly by reduction of overall fuel consumption, the other air pollutants
emission targets would also be met. This is why a focus given to CO2 target would
probably not offset the achievement of other pollutants targets.
It could be said that in the longer term, e.g. more than 30 years, completely new and
perhaps truly “clean” technology will be available. However the current situation
requires immediate actions to be undertaken, whether addressing the local/regional
pollution issue in urbanised areas in both industrialised and developing countries, or
the Rio objectives on GHG emissions which are much more ambitious than the Kyoto
ones. As already pointed in the previously quoted studies, technology alone will not
be sufficient.
Safety, physical disruption and noise
Apart from these environmental aspects, the need to maintain the quality of life also
implies dealing with the safety hazards posed by vehicle traffic, not only for motorists
but also for pedestrians and cyclists. It also implies minimising the disruption caused
by transportation infrastructure works; this increases further the cost of projects for
burying or covering roads.  Vehicle hazards translate statistically into numbers of
accidents, deaths and injuries, and remain a major problem in most countries, linked
to the continuous growth of road traffic.
Finally, one of the worst nuisances felt by city dwellers is the noise that penetrates
their homes.  For instance this has become a subject of major concern in the European
Union.  Yet the disparity of exposure is great: vehicle traffic is more disturbing in
large cities, while motorcycles and heavy trucks are a greater concern in suburban or
sparsely populated areas.  This problem also has obvious social implications: for
example, in France the number of people subject to an average noise level of more
than 65 dB is four times as high among the lowest income groups than among the
wealthiest.  Generally speaking, the conjunction of urban crowding and automobile
                                                









































traffic growth tends to increase people’s exposure to noise.  Despite efforts to date to
equip urban highways with acoustic barriers, technical solutions remain very limited.
1.3.  Selecting a control strategy and instruments
In seeking an optimal, or at least acceptable, balance for the community as a whole, a
trade-off must be made between the advantages offered by the development and use
of transportation systems, on one hand, and the environmental and social costs which
follow from, on the other hand.  This trade-off should be such as to maximise the total
net surplus for the community, i.e. advantages less costs.
Strategies for controlling the transportation system must take account of certain
specific features of transportation, in comparison to conventional economic goods.
For the transportation system user (motorist, pedestrian, public transit passenger,
freight carrier) transportation is an intermediate good: it allows a citizen, for example,
to pursue his work in a given place, or a wholesale business to deliver a good to a
retailer for sale.  The demand for transportation is a derivative of the demand for
conducting activities in determined places, or the demand to make goods available in
determined sites.  It follows that transportation, since it consists of a service for
moving goods and people between two given places, is a unique good in spatial terms:
a given movement can rarely be substituted by another, because it will not have the
same utility.
This intermediary good is itself not storable, and not transportable, which explains
why its production is subject to specific peaks in space and time.  This production
involves the following agents:
•  The public authorities who regulate the transport activity, supply the
infrastructure, and subsidise the transport operation, sometimes through public-
private partnership. 
•  Automobile makers who provide the vehicles that use the roads.  
•  Oil producers, importers and refiners, who supply the fuel used in the vehicles.  
•  Road hauliers, companies using road for transporting freight for their own
account, and other transportation operators providing transport service, including
urban public transport, railways, coach lines, taxis and airlines operators.  
•  Households, through their own automotive consumption (car purchase,
maintenance and use).  
•  As well, transport infrastructure and service users inject their own travelling time
as an input in the production of transportation.
Available controlling instruments involve not only the transportation system in its
strict sense, but also land use management.  They may be broken down into the
following categories:
•  Regulations governing land use (lot occupancy coefficients, zoning), roadway use
(traffic regulation, sharing the road between different modes, speed limits), fuel
standards and vehicles (emission and safety standards).  
•  Taxation, essentially through fuel taxes, but also through land use taxes (real
estate and home occupancy taxes).  









































•  Voluntary agreements negotiated with business industries, such that they limit
their emission or consumption of depletable resources.
•  Infrastructure user fees, through road tolls and railway fares.  
•  Land use planning policies, through exercise of expropriation rights and official
powers to decide the location of public facilities.  
•  Financing the supply of infrastructure and transportation services (by the means of
the general budget, specific taxes, or user fees, sometimes through a public-private
partnership), and subsidisation of new technology developments (new engines,
new fuels, etc.)  
•  Organisation of transport markets (organisation and regulation of markets,
concessions and licenses).
1.4.  Pros and cons of using transferable permits in the transport
sector
Two main criteria can be used for judging the relevance of permits systems
9: these
are, on one hand, the ability to impose a constraint or a right defined in a quantitative
manner within a specified space-time, and on the other hand the ability that agents
have to transfer all or a portion of these quantitative obligations.  
First, permit systems are of particular interest because of the relevance of certain of
their attributes
10 to control of the transport sector:
•  In cases where a given environmental performance must be achieved in a context
of uncertainty over agents' price response functions;  in such cases a permit
system is more likely to achieve a quantitative objective than taxation.
•  In cases where agents are more sensitive to quantitative signals than to price
signals (notably if the elasticity of demand to prices is low in the short or medium
term).
•  In terms of flexible implementation of control policy, permit systems (like road
tolls) can be used to target local and regional problems arising from transport
activities.
•  In political terms, systems in which permits are allocated free of charge are seen
by agents as a means of avoiding an additional tax: in some cases, e.g. high fuel
duties in Europe, this can enhance the acceptability of the new instrument.
•  A quota system is the only type of system which allows distributive impacts to be
treated explicitly and separately from the issue of the economically efficient
allocation of efforts to reduce environmental damage.  Given the fundamental role
that transport plays in the right to mobility, these distributive impacts merit close
attention.
Since the most difficult step is firstly to set up permits in the transport sector, most of
the discussion on pros and cons is about permits system per se. Making them
transferable is a second step which would essentially add transaction costs, as
mentioned below.
                                                
9 Cf. OECD, 2001










































Besides the previous general aspects, there are other arguments in favour of the use of
permit systems in the transport sector.
In many instances it is possible to set precise and measurable targets, as in the case of
local or global emissions of air pollutants (greenhouse gases) or congestion.  In all
cases, it is the sum of individual outputs of agents which produces the overall output
11.
In contrast, this does not apply to noise which does not increase linearly in accordance
with the number of individual emissions.
It is also possible in many of the cases to establish space-time equivalents of
aggregate nuisances, as in the case of local or regional air pollution for which permits
can be traded within the corresponding geographical area;  this is also the case for
global air pollution such as greenhouse gas emissions, for which the corresponding
geographical area is obviously the planet.  Such equivalents can not be applied as
readily to congestion, which is a phenomenon that is usually restricted to specific
routes and times of the day.  It would nonetheless be possible, in the case of
conglomerations or urban areas subject to widespread road congestion, to design
quota systems applicable to trips made by road within the area
12.
Lastly, the appearance of threshold effects may require a quantity-based approach to
be adopted.  This is clearly the case for greenhouse gas emissions, but also applies to
local emissions of air pollutants which must not be allowed to exceed specific
thresholds beyond which they become a health hazard.
Arguments against
Among the arguments against the use of permit systems in the transport system, the
foremost is the question of the cost of administering such systems which by definition
target a large number of mobile sources.  From this standpoint, if the target nuisance
can be linked, with an acceptable degree of approximation, to fuel consumption (for
reducing greenhouse gases emissions, for example), then increasing existing duties on
fuel would naturally be the cheapest solution.  In other cases such as congestion, the
use of automatic vehicle identification technology to collect electronic road tolls from
moving vehicles, a practice that is currently growing rapidly, would seem to be the
most appropriate solution.  Indeed this technology can provide a basis for reducing the
administrative costs of certain types of permit system (see the case study below on
Ecopoints in Austria).  
Moreover, making permits transferable would involve well-known transaction costs
(Stavins, 1995). Resolving this issue of administrative and transaction costs is a key
element in the introduction of any transferable permit system in the transport sector.
We shall see in the case studies examined later in this report how this issue can be
dealt with under different conditions.
                                                
11 Primary gases in the case of air pollutants.  Possible secondary chemical reactions, such as ozone
formation, are not taken into account.









































It is by no means clear, a priori, which of the two instruments would be the least
socially acceptable, i.e. rationing of the activity either by outputs (permits) or by
prices (a much higher tax than currently to meet the objective of reducing emissions):
such a rationing would target indirectly, at least in the short term, the number and
length of automobile trips. Since the automobile plays a fundamental role in mobility,
as there is frequently no transport alternative, that would make explicit restriction on
freedom of movement, a fundamental right that is universally recognised in
declarations of human rights such as that of the United Nations.
Lastly, compared with the sole use of regulations, transferable permits would
introduce the notion of a commercial transaction on the rationing of the universal
right to freedom of movement, as mentioned above.  In many cultural contexts this
might represent an additional handicap.
1.5.  The potential for transferable permit programs in the
transportation sector
The global output of transportation activity is the result of a combination of factors
relating to land use (location of activities and consequences for distances travelled),
the supply of infrastructure and services (price and quality of service for different
modes of transport), technical features of transport vehicles (energy source, unit
consumption, emissions) and the intensity of vehicle use (mobility as a function of
economic and social trends).  These factors all offer potential fields of action for
controlling nuisances in the transport sector.
The first potential field concerns land use, and in particular the battle against urban
sprawl and the dispersal of activities, which lead to longer travel distances: these
longer distances are most often travelled by private automobile, since in such
scattered settings there is no public transit alternative.  This field is currently managed
through the regulatory approach, but it could be the subject of quantitative controls in
the form of rights yet to be devised.
A second field concerns the supply of infrastructure, which is today controlled
primarily by the availability of financing through general budgets, but is increasingly
the subject of user fees.  The use of permits would not seem appropriate in this field, a
priori, but we will suggest hereafter some points for debate on the co-ordination
between permits and financing.
A third area concerns, on one hand, vehicle technology, through the regulation of unit
emissions of local or global (greenhouse) air pollutants, and on the other hand, the
technical characteristics of fuels.  This is where we find the most advanced use of
permits, as we shall see below, applied either to automakers or to fuel refiners (quality
standards).
A fourth field concerns total fuel consumption by vehicles, as a function both of the
intensity of use and of unit consumption, where the natural instrument is a tax.









































wisdom of exploring permits systems that would target the intensity of carbon
consumption inherent in fuel consumption.
Finally, there is a fifth field, related to the previous one, which also involves
controlling vehicle use but is focused more precisely on VKT (vehicle kilometres
travelled), as a medium-term solution for controlling noise emissions or congestion.
The most common approach to noise control is still through regulation or funding for
acoustic protection around transportation infrastructure.  With respect to congestion,
control is still achieved essentially through the waiting line, despite the ongoing and
long-time debate about congestion pricing.  One relevant use of permits could
therefore involve setting quotas on VKT or trips within a given urban area that would
be allocated to motorists and could be transferred among them
13.  
In addition to the well-known problems of designing and implementing transferable
permits systems in general
14, however, their use in transportation systems involves
some specific considerations.  These relate, on one hand, to the great number of
externality sources, and on the other hand, to the burden of a regulatory system that,
as described briefly above, is already quite complex.
The great number of mobile emission sources that automobiles represent constitutes
an obvious obstacle to decentralising permit systems in the transportation sector, since
administrative costs would appear, a priori, to be prohibitive.  This explains why most
proposals to decentralise permits have stopped at the level of automobile makers, and
have been targeted at unit vehicle emissions.  We shall return to this question later.
The pre-existence of a complex control system for the transport sector implies that the
design of transferable permits will have to consider how they can be inserted into the
system.  As we shall see in the following case studies, these systems can be used as a
supplement to existing controls.
Given the limited scope of this study, it has been impossible to explore all the
potential fields identified above.  We have selected four case studies that illustrate the
diversity of possible applications.
2.  THE CASE STUDIES
The first case study is the US lead phase-down in gasoline and illustrates the case of
fuel quality standards. This is a program of lead rights tradable between refineries that
was implemented from 1982 to 1988 to ease the accelerated phase-down of lead in
gasoline until a complete ban came into effect in the USA in 1996. 
The second case study is the Ecopoints system for heavy goods vehicles (HGV) in
transit (Austria) and points to the issue of vehicle intensity of use. This is a non-
tradable permits system which was introduced in Austria in 1992 to prevent an
excessive rise in HGV emissions throughout the country’s Alpine region. Although
the permits are not transferable, the experience gained in this experiment serves to
                                                
13 See Verhoef et al (1996), Marlot (1998).









































highlight the potential advantages and drawbacks of permit systems applied to mobile
sources such as HGV.
The third case study is California’s Zero Emission Vehicles (ZEV) program and
illustrates the case of unit vehicle emissions. This is an on-going scheme of tradable
permits aimed at reducing the level of local pollution stemming from car use, by
increasing the proportion of ZEVs and LEVs (Low Emission Vehicles) sold by
automobile manufacturers in California. 
The fourth case is a prospective study in France for introducing transferable permits
within the transport sector in order to control the GHG emissions of this sector. It was
conducted by a working party of experts and representatives of transport operators
and users. The study reviewed possibilities for introducing both “upstream” and
“downstream” tradable permits and covers the wide range of implementation levels,
from unit vehicle emissions to fuel whole consumption
2.1.  The Lead Phase-down Program (USA)
The objective of this program was to eliminate use of lead as a gasoline additive in the
United States.  This system of granting refineries rights to add lead to gasoline was
part of a family of permits based on the concept of averaging.  The program was in
place from 1979 to 1996, when lead was effectively banned.  It was also accompanied
by a program of rights transfers that was in operation from 1982 to 1987: the trading
of rights between refineries was authorised from 1982 to 1986, and the banking of
rights was authorised from 1985 to 1987.
2.1.1.  Context
Lead is one of the substances added to gasoline to increase the octane rating and
reduce engine knock.  These properties were discovered by engineers at General
Motors in 1921, and the use of lead spread quickly.  The toxic effect on human health
of lead in high doses had been suspected, if not fully understood, since Roman
antiquity at least.  But it was only after the enormous expansion of lead use, as
automobile travel became generalised, that the first scientific proof of its toxicity,
even in low doses, surfaced during the 1960s and 1970s: lead then came to be seen as
a threat to public health (Lewis, 1985).
The combustion of leaded gasoline disperses lead particles into the atmosphere.  Lead
is a severely toxic pollutant that causes neurological dysfunction that can have grave
consequences, particularly on the foetus and on children.  In adults, low doses
provoke hypertension and increased risk of heart disease.  This, then, was the primary
motivation of the control programs that were introduced in many countries to cut back
or completely eliminate lead in gasoline.
The second motivation for phasing out lead in gasoline had to do with the use of
catalytic converters, which are rendered inoperable by the presence of lead in the fuel.
Catalytic converters were introduced by all U.S. automakers, beginning in 1975, to









































carbon monoxide, oxides of nitrogen).  This requirement also explains the declining
consumption of leaded gasoline, as the automobile fleet was gradually renewed.
The use of lead as an automotive gasoline additive has now been banned in most
OECD countries.  On the other hand, lead continues to be widely used in Africa, in
Central and South America, in Asia and in Eastern Europe.  In many of these regions
there is no lead-free gasoline available (Kaysi et al. 2000).  The essential rationale
behind continued use of lead in some countries is that lead is still the least expensive
means for increasing the octane rating of fuel
15.
2.1.2.  Program description
16
The regulatory program for reducing lead in gasoline was initiated by the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency in December 1973.  The EPA is a federal agency
responsible for defining and enforcing environmental regulations and standards
pursuant to federal environmental legislation, and in particular the Clean Air Act.
Flexibility was built into the lead phase-down program in a series of three successive
stages: averaging, trading and banking.
First stage: averaging over a quarterly compliance period.
At the end of 1973, the EPA proposed new regulations for a five-year reduction in the
average lead content of all gasoline products (leaded and unleaded) for every refinery,
measured on a quarterly basis: this average was to be cut from the current level of
about 2 grams per gallon to a maximum of 0.6 grams per gallon in 1978.
Enforcement of the new regulation was held up for several years by lawsuits, and the
0.5 grams-per-gallon rule came into effect only on October 1, 1979.  This was the first
stage in the introduction of a degree of flexibility in the standard, which was applied
not to each gallon but as an average to total output over a three-month period.
Second stage: tightening of the standard and introduction of the rights trading option
New scientific revelations about the toxicity of lead allowed the EPA to tighten the
standard in 1982, to a maximum of 1.1 grams per gallon, but calculated this time
solely on the total of leaded gasoline produced by the refinery.  As well, the very
small refineries were granted a slightly less rigorous rule, from October 1, 1979 to
July 1, 1983.
To facilitate this adjustment, a program was introduced for trading rights to add
determined amounts of lead to gasoline.
This rights trading program reflected a concern to give refiners (in particular the
smaller ones) some flexibility in adapting to the new rules.
                                                
15 The alternatives consist of replacing lead by oxygenate additives such as ethanol or methanol, which
are less expensive, or modifying refineries to use other procedures for increasing the octane rating
(platforming, alkylation, isomerisation).










































The rights allocated to each refinery were calculated in terms of the quantity of leaded
gasoline produced by the refinery and the authorised amount of lead per gallon (as
determined by the EPA).  For example, a refinery producing 100 million gallons of
leaded gasoline during any quarter of 1983 or 1984, when the standard was 1.1 g per
gallon, received rights to 110 million grams for the quarter.  If the refinery added less
than the authorised amount of lead, it could sell its lead rights up to an amount equal
to the difference between the actual amount added and the norm.  If on the other hand
the refinery wanted to add more lead than the rule allowed, it would have to purchase
rights prorated to the excess.
The balance between rights held or acquired and rights needed for each refinery was
recalculated every quarter, and had to be either positive or nil.
The validity of the rights was limited to three months.  Refiners could use up their
rights over the course of that period (by adding more or less lead to their gasoline
during the quarter) or they could sell these rights to other refiners during the same
period.  Any rights not used or sold would expire at the end of the quarter for which
they were created.
This last rule was amended with introduction of “banking” in 1985.
Third stage: further tightening and introduction of the rights banking option
The allowable level of lead in gasoline was further reduced to 0.5 g per gallon in mid
1985, and the EPA announced that the program for trading rights between refineries
would end in 1986.  In 1985 the EPA also introduced the banking of rights, which
could be used until the end of 1987.
In anticipation of the tightening of the rule in mid 1985, refineries added less than the
authorised amount of lead during the first two quarters of 1985, and banked the
balance of their rights: the smaller refiners were then able to use or buy banked rights
from the larger refiners during the second half of the year, and could thereby exceed
the norm.
In 1986, the standard was cut again to 0.1 g per gallon, while the ability of a refinery
to bank its rights was abolished.  Rights acquired by one refinery from another could
still be banked, but few refiners took advantage of this possibility.  The reaction of
refiners was to use their previously accumulated rights to continue exceeding the
stricter standard.
Fourth stage: windup of the rights transfer program
The rights trading program came to a close at the end of 1986.  On the other hand,
banked rights could still be used until the end of 1987. In 1988, after the rights
transfer program was terminated, the 0.1 g per gallon rule was applied to each refinery
individually.  Lead was finally banned as an additive to gasoline for road vehicles in
1996.
In summary, during the course of the gasoline lead reduction program, which ran from









































Participants in the program
All refiners were subject to the EPA rule governing the authorised amount of leaded
gasoline.  On the other hand, participation in the rights trading program was optional.
In 1983 and 1984, for example, it is estimated that there were between 300 and 400
refineries involved in such trading.
Managing transfers
No prior approval was required from the EPA for trading permits, but an ex post
declaration had to be submitted (see below).
There were however some minor restrictions on trading:
•  California refiners, which were subject to a stricter standard, could not resort to
trading in order to exceed the State norm.  
•  Small refineries, which initially faced a less severe standard, were not allowed to
sell their rights to the large refiners.
This second restriction was eliminated on July 1, 1983, after which time all refiners
were subject to the same standard.
The most important restriction concerned the life of the permits, which was limited to
three months after 1985.  Nevertheless, there was significant trading both before and
after that date.
Monitoring and auditing
Under the regulations, every refinery had to submit a quarterly declaration to the EPA
on its output of gasoline and the amount of lead used.  Refineries participating in the
trading and banking programs also had to indicate in the declaration the amounts
traded or banked, and the refineries with which they had conducted their trades.
Overall, transaction costs as identified by Kerr and Maré (1998) were not
insignificant: they included the costs of optimisation, the costs of seeking a partner
and researching prices, the cost of uncertainty about the validity of permits that were,
in practice, traded before they were validated by the EPA at the end of each quarter,
the costs of negotiation and the costs of disclosing confidential information on
refinery output.  The presence of these costs explains why the smaller refineries, those
belonging to companies of smaller scale or with fewer refineries, tended not to
participate in the trading.  By contrast, refineries belonging to the larger companies
were more active in trading, reflecting their degree of specialisation in producing
different types of fuel.
2.1.3.  Assessment
The market for these rights was very active, and the volume of trading between
refineries rose steadily as the standard was progressively tightened.  In 1983 and 1984
there were between 300 and 400 potential participants in the trading, and refineries
purchased between 10 and 20 percent of all the lead rights they used (Kerr and Maré,









































the banking option further stimulated trading from 1986 onward.  The portion of lead
rights traded reached 50 percent of the total by mid 1987 (Hahn and Hester, 1989).
Overall, the small refiners were net buyers of rights from the large refiners, which
adjusted more quickly to the standard.  However, some of the small refiners also took
advantage of the program by selling their rights.
Costs and benefits of the program
Since the trading was conducted freely and was subject only to a simple declaration,
the EPA did not collect systematic data on the trading price of rights.  It would appear
that the price was about one cent per gram of lead before banking was authorised, and
rose to between two and five cents per gram thereafter (Hahn and Hester, 1989).
Enforcement of the standard for gasoline lead additives, quite apart from the rights
transfer program, required the EPA to monitor and audit the amounts of lead
consumed by the refiners.  The incremental cost of administering the rights transfer
program were limited to ex post controls over trading between refineries and the
detection of invalid rights.  It could be said, then, that the administrative costs due
specifically to the transfer program were very modest.
Cost savings to the refiners from the trading and banking program have been
estimated at several hundred million dollars (Hahn and Hester, 1989)
Finally, Kerr and Newell (2001) have shown that the refiners with the lowest
adaptation costs were more likely to adopt new technologies under the marketable
permits regime, and this encouraged the spread of those technologies.
The debate over the program's cost efficiency
It has been objected that the concept of allocating rights proportionate to total leaded
gasoline produced was in itself an incentive to overproduction of leaded gasoline.  In
response, it has been argued that, since the addition of lead is the most profitable way
to increase fuel octane ratings, the total amount of lead authorised by the standard
would have been used whether there was a trading program or not.  That program
merely rearranged the distribution and use of lead among refineries, and did not
increase the total amount of lead that could be used.  Moreover, any incentive to
overproduction of leaded gasoline was offset by the constantly rising market share of
unleaded gasoline, as vehicles with catalytic converters became more common.
The fact that refineries were free to manage their rights without prior certification, and
that their only constraint was to file a declaration at the end of each quarter, was
certainly an advantage in activating the market, but it also gave rise to legal problems.
Since the balance between rights acquired and rights required was calculated at the
time of the end-of-quarter declaration to the EPA, it was possible that rights might be
sold only to be found invalid after the sale, having been improperly created, either by
error or intentionally.  Once they were sold -- and they could in effect be resold
several times by brokers -- it was difficult if not impossible to blame the error on a









































Moreover, the emergence of brokerage activity as a means of facilitating trading had
no formal connection to the EPA program.  Brokers did not take ownership of the
rights, but merely established a market between refineries.  The EPA therefore has no
direct knowledge of the scope of their intervention.
In the end, the program was regarded as a success: the total authorised amount of lead
was not exceeded, and some refiners that would likely not have remained in business
in the absence of this flexibility were in fact able to adapt successfully.
2.1.4.  Conclusions and lessons
The success of the program can be explained by the lack of restrictions on trading and
by the possibility of banking: the market thus remained very active.  Administrative
requirements were kept to a minimum (a simple declaration of trading and additive
purchases).  But these factors alone cannot explain its success: we must add the fact
that the refiners were accustomed to dealing together on other markets, in particular
for other additives (Hahn and Hester, 1989).
In summary, this program exhibited three basic features that may be taken as essential
ingredients for ensuring the success of the transferable permits program:
•  A precise definition of the permit unit (gram of lead) eliminated all ambiguity as
to what was being traded or banked.  
•  The rules to be followed were simple and trading could be conducted freely.  
•  Program implementation was pragmatic, and offered several options.
A further positive factor that facilitated implementation of the program was the
availability of affordable technological solutions for replacing lead in gasoline,
together with the fact that the consumption of leaded gasoline was on a declining
trend because of the evolution of the automotive fleet.  The transferable rights
program served to accelerate the decline in lead use.
We may say that, in terms of the continuing consumption of leaded gasoline in other
parts of the world (see Introduction), a program of this type could be a viable option,
provided the local political and regulatory context is appropriate.
2.2.  The Ecopoint program in Austria
Ecopoint is an ongoing program for limiting pollution and noise from truck traffic
passing in transit through Austria.  It belongs to the quotas category, but in this case
they are of the "cap but no trade" type, since they are not transferable.  The interest in
analysing this program is to show how a system of permits applied to mobile sources










































Austria is located at the crossroads of Central Europe's transit routes.  Through it pass
the north-south route between Italy and Germany and one of the major links between
countries of Eastern Europe and Western Europe
17.
Austria’s typically mountainous geography funnels north-south traffic along Alpine
valleys, and in particular the Brenner Valley, where the ecosystem is very fragile.
The morphology of these valleys is such that exhaust emissions cannot readily escape,
and highway noise is intensified.  The concentration of nitrogen oxides is three times
as high as on a plain with similar traffic volumes.
Moreover, until recently neighbouring Switzerland has imposed a maximum truck
limit of 28 tons, versus 40 tons in European Union.  Beginning 2001 these regulatory
limits have been suppressed (free traffic for 28-34 tons, quotas until 2005 for 34-40
tons) while road fees are imposed on trucks. Waiting at borders and road fee still
constitute an incentive for north-south traffic to take alternative routes through France
or through Austria. 
The result has been a sharp and steady increase in truck traffic transiting through
Austria: such traffic rose by 46.9 percent between 1993 and 1999, for trucks of
member States of the EU-12, to a total of 1,445,700 trips in 1999
18, with an
increasingly adverse impact on the natural and human environment in the areas
traversed.  The Brenner Valley received more than 60 percent of this traffic in 1999.
At the same time, freight transiting by rail rose by 35.66 percent between 1991 and
1999 (52.7 percent between 1993 and 1999, with a sharp decline in 1993).  It
amounted to more than 23 million tons in 1999.  More than a quarter of this freight
moves between Germany and Italy.
Concern over this growing pressure on the environment led Austria to negotiate an
agreement with the European Economic Community in 1992, calling for a reduction
in noise and atmospheric pollution generated by heavy trucks transiting through
Austria.  The chosen target is NOx emissions produced by trucks of a gross weight of
more than 7.5 tons.  The initial objective in the agreement was to reduce these
emissions by 60 percent, as compared to the reference year 1991, over the 12 year life
of the agreement, i.e. by 2003.
In 1995, when Austria joined the European Union, this agreement was confirmed as a
derogation to the Single Market provisions.  Protocol 9 of Austria's act of accession
extends the regime to December 31, 2003.
2.2.2.  Program description
The agreement between the EEC and Austria introduced a system of transit rights
known as "Ecopoints" ("Ökopunkte") for heavy goods vehicles of a gross weight of
more than 7.5 tons transiting through Austria, whether loaded or empty.
                                                
17 The main reference used for this report is CEC (2000), apart from a few Internet resources.









































The trucks concerned are those of all European Union member countries and certain
other countries (Switzerland, Norway, Liechtenstein and Slovenia) that have signed
agreements with European Union.
Emissions are represented by a quota of points called Ecopoints, which must be used
by trucks transiting through Austria.  The total quota as calculated in 1991 is to be
reduced every year on a straight-line basis to reach the 60 percent reduction target in
2003.
Definition of Ecopoints and period of validity
Since October 1, 1990, unit emissions of heavy vehicles are referenced in an approval
document produced at the time the vehicle is manufactured.  Each member State must
establish a COP (Conformity of Production) document for the vehicle, declaring NOx
emissions and the number of Ecopoints required to travel through Austria.
An Ecopoint corresponds to the emission of one gram of NOx per kilowatt-hour
(kWh).  For example, a vehicle normally emitting 10 grams of NOx per kilowatt-hour
will have to use up 10 Ecopoints to transit Austria.
For vehicles manufactured before October 1, 1990, or without a COP document, a flat
charge of 16 Ecopoints is required.  When a vehicle receives a new engine, it will be
given a new COP document.
Ecopoints are valid from January 1 of each year until January 31 of the following
year, i.e. for 13 months.  This allows hauliers to avoid having to use two different sets
of Ecopoints when making round trips at the end of the year.
Initial allocation
Ecopoints are distributed by the European Commission among member States
according to an allocation schedule established in the regulations and periodically
revised by the Commission.  Countries are then responsible for redistributing their
Ecopoints among their own hauliers.
The allocation schedule among States was based on their share of the traffic between
the Community and Austria in 1991.  In practice, Italy and Germany use two-thirds of
the Ecopoints, while the third-largest user is Austria itself (15 percent).
A Community reserve has been established, holding 3.34 percent of each member
State's allocation, to meet any temporary deficit of Ecopoints.
Ecopoints are allocated to member States every year by the Commission in two
blocks, one before October 1 of the year preceding the year of validity of the
Ecopoints, and the other after March 1 of the validity year.  Countries that do not
expect to use all of their allocated Ecopoints must return the unused points by October
15 of their validity year.  The Commission can then redistribute these points, together
with those from the Community reserve, to other countries, in accordance with
recognised criteria, and at latest one month before the end of the validity year.  This









































The transfer of Ecopoints, then, does not involve any kind of market.  It is done
exclusively through an administrative process that involves all participating States,
and is limited to unused Ecopoints.
NOx emissions were targeted in order to encourage the use of increasingly cleaner
trucks.  A further objective was to reduce noise.  To avoid a situation where NOx
emissions might be reduced while allowing an increase in transit traffic, a special
quantitative limit on transit trips, the so-called "108 percent clause", was imposed
from the outset: if the number of transit trips in any given year exceeds that of the
reference year 1991 by more than 8 percent, the number of Ecopoints distributed in
the following year must be cut by 20 percent beyond the linear reduction already
established.
Such a situation occurred in 1999, and sparked a dispute between Austria and other
member States: this was settled by the European Commission in 2000, by suspending
temporarily enforcement of the clause.  According to that clause, many countries
(including Germany, the principal user of Ecopoints), would have reached their quota
as early as the summer of 2000: carriers from those countries would no longer have
been able to transit through Austria.  This crisis, marked by demonstrations in Austria
against truck traffic on the Brenner motorway, led to a reassessment of the program
and proposals for reform from the European Commission.  In February 2001, the
Commission set forth new regulations that would: suspend the "108 percent clause"
on an exceptional basis for the year 2000, but confirm its enforcement for the years
2001 to 2003; impose a new reduction in Ecopoints until 2003 to reach the initial
objective of a 60 percent cut; and establish a four-year rescheduling of the reduction
of Ecopoints that would result from renewed enforcement of the 108 percent clause.
This reduction would be shared among member States as a function of the growth rate
of traffic generated by their own hauliers.  However, Austria appealed to the European
Court of Justice to overturn the new regulations and on February 23, 2001, the
President of the Court ordered suspension of the measure rescheduling the Ecopoint
reductions over four years.
Monitoring and auditing
The Ecopoints were initially issued in paper format, a system that required systematic
manual controls at the border.  With Austria's entry into the European Union and
abolition of internal border controls within the Union, systematic border stopping
were no longer required and a system had to be found that was compatible with these
new provisions.
This was accomplished with the introduction, on January 1, 1988, of an electronic
system for processing Ecopoints by automatically detecting heavy vehicles with the
aid of an onboard device.
Consistent with the desire of member States to minimise the cost to hauliers of
installing the equipment, it is a very simple device.  The onboard electronic
transponder
19, called an "Ecotag”, identifies the haulier and the vehicle and contains
details from its COP document.
                                                









































The haulier must first register with the competent authorities of his own country, who
have a direct link to the central system in Austria for recording information on
hauliers, their vehicles (COP data) and their Ecopoint credits.  The haulier must
purchase an Ecotag (available in member countries and at the main Austrian border
points) and then, before its first use, it must be initialised and mounted behind the
vehicle's windshield by Austrian officials on duty at selected border crossings.
The Ecotag automatically signals the passage of the truck across the border
20.  It is
only if the vehicle is en route to a destination in Austria (and not in transit) that the
driver must push a button to signal this exemption.  Information on the date, time and
point of entry into Austria are recorded in the Ecotag.  These data allow for inspection
by mobile control units within the country.  Upon leaving the country, the vehicle's
passage will again be detected by the electronic station, which will read the
information recorded in the Ecotag and transmit it to the central system that maintains
haulier accounts.  If Ecopoints are required, the central system debits the points,
transmits an electronic invoice to the haulier's country and notifies the authorities of
any trips not covered by sufficient Ecopoints.  The system will reject Ecopoints if
their validity date has expired.  Hauliers can consult the balance on their Ecopoint
account through national terminals located in member countries.
European regulations require that the electronic system must be used for most transit
trips.  This means the purchase and installation of the Ecotag device, which may seem
an excessive burden for occasional transit trips.  The regulations therefore authorise
each member country to use the paper system up to a limit of 0.6 percent of the total
quota, or some 9,000 trips for each country.  In practice, more than 95 percent of
Ecopoints are handled electronically.
For vehicles without Ecotags transiting Austrian borders within the European Union,
the driver must cancel the paper Ecopoints in special machines located at the principal
points of entry to Austria.  Random controls are performed on vehicles travelling
within the country.
Systematic control of paper Ecopoints has been retained at Austria's frontiers with non
EU countries.  The driver must present his COP document and the required Ecopoints,
which will be stamped.  One copy is retained by the Austrian entry-point authorities,
one is kept by the driver as proof for presentation during random inspections, and a
third copy is handed over to the authorities upon exiting Austria. The year of validity
is printed on the paper Ecopoints, and they must not be used after the expiration of
their validity period.
About 4 percent of trips declared by Ecotag involve unauthorised use, and perhaps
half one million fraudulent Ecopoints are used each year.  On the other hand, there are
no data on fraud committed by vehicles not equipped with Ecotags
21.
Regulatory framework and authority responsible for program operation
The principle of the Ecopoint program was adopted by the European Union upon
Austria's accession in 1995, as a derogation from the provisions governing the Single
                                                
20 169 border crossings are equipped with overhead electronic readers.









































Market, which prohibit any barrier to trade in goods between member States.
Nevertheless, to the extent that the Ecopoint program applies to all member States, it
does not violate the essential principles of non-discrimination and harmonisation of
competition.  The Ecopoint distribution formula is established by regulation of the
European Commission.
The Ecopoint system is the property of the Austrian Ministry of Transport.
Installation and operation of the electronic system has been contracted to a private
operator.
2.2.3.  Evaluation and comment
There is very little quantitative data available on the costs and benefits of the Ecopoint
program.  With regard to costs, one must consider the fact that electronic road pricing
systems targeting trucks will be implemented and interoperable in the short term in
several European countries: this is already the case in Switzerland since 2001 and it is
planned in Austria and Germany. Thus it can be assumed that once these systems are
operating the incremental cost of operating a permit system addressing truck traffic in
ecologically sensitive areas will be low.
In terms of benefits, there has been a very clear technological training effect.  The
proportion of trucks (measured by number of trips) paying 15 Ecopoints or more
dropped from 51 percent in 1993 to less than 2 percent in 1999.  On the other hand,
the proportion of trucks paying 7 Ecopoints or less (EURO II) skyrocketed from 0.1
percent in 1993 to more than 78 percent in 1999
22.  Thus, the average number of
Ecopoints used by member country trucks has declined more swiftly than the target
value established in the agreement.
Although it is impossible to say exactly what role the Ecopoints have played in this
technological evolution, it is probable that the system has had a supplementary effect
in accelerating the impact of the overall program for tightening European emission
standards (EURO I, II and III).
On the other hand, the program’s design has revealed a number of shortcomings.
These are of four kinds: insufficient coverage of pollution sources, lack of incentive to
use even cleaner trucks, an excessively comprehensive measure for addressing the
objective of preserving alpine valleys, and a degree of mistargeting in environmental
terms.
First limitation: inadequate coverage of pollution sources
Several categories of heavy goods vehicles escape the obligation to produce
Ecopoints:
•  Trucks en route to or from destinations in Austria are not affected by the Ecopoint
system.  The same is true for trucks travelling exclusively within Austria.  
                                                









































•  Trucks from non-member countries
23 of the European Union and those using
ECMT permits
24 are also exempt.  
•  The system does not apply to light-duty vehicles (less than 3.5 tons PTAC) or to
buses, which produce NOx emissions at levels similar to those of trucks.
In short, most heavy-duty vehicles travelling in Austria do not pay Ecopoints, because
they are travelling to or from points in Austria.  This loophole could provide an
incentive to circumvent the Ecopoint system by splitting a transit trip into two trips,
and simply transferring the cargo within Austrian territory.
Second limitation: lack of incentive to use cleaner trucks
Statistics on the average Ecopoints used by member State trucks show that the number
declined by 44.7 percent from 1993 to 1999, or more swiftly than the target values
established in the agreement.
Now that low-emission vehicles are in production and are being used, the "108
percent clause" represents a hindrance to the development of truly low-emission
vehicles.  In effect, using such vehicles would only make sense if additional trips
beyond the 108 percent could be made for the same number of Ecopoints, which is
not the case.
Third limitation: an excessively broad measure for meeting the objective of preserving
alpine valleys
Although most transit traffic passes through the Alps (60 percent through the Brenner
pass), the Ecopoint system applies to the entire territory of Austria.  The system
makes it possible for transit traffic, and hence emissions, to grow sharply in the alpine
valleys as long as it is offset by reductions on the plains.  The system as currently
designed, then, is not accurately targeted at protecting regions that are particularly
sensitive to local emissions.
Fourth limitation: environmental mistargeting
Targeting NOx emissions was seen as an indirect way of limiting overall nuisances,
not only in terms of atmospheric pollution but also of noise.  However, trucks have
become steadily cleaner, and have exceeded the specific objective set for NOx
emissions.
Given that traffic volumes have been maintained and have even grown, despite the
108 percent clause (which was suspended for a time), there has been no improvement
in other nuisances such as noise.  In fact, the noise problem is unlikely to be abated
unless something is done at the point of contact between the tire and the pavement, or
unless traffic is moderated.  The NOx emissions target thus no longer plays a role in
reducing the general level of nuisance from the road transport of goods.
                                                
23 With the notable exceptions of Switzerland, Norway, Liechtenstein and Slovenia, which also use the
Ecopoint system.










































The Ecopoint system has the advantage, first of all, of showing that it is technically
quite feasible to apply a quota-based system of permits to mobile sources within a
defined area.  It thus provides one element of a response to the frequently heard
objection that the administrative costs of permit systems for mobile sources will be
too high.
The Ecopoint system suffers from several limitations, however, that could well
present stumbling blocks for other programs of a similar nature designed to protect
sensitive regions:
•  To target nuisance vehicles in a given region more thoroughly would require a
great many electronic detection devices: a trade-off would have to be found
between the costs and benefits involved, depending on highway geography.  Such
as system would only be applicable in certain fairly specific geographical
configurations (for example in valleys with few points of entry and exit).  
•  If there is to be continued incentive for further reductions in unit vehicle
emissions, restrictions on total traffic volume would have to be abandoned.  
•  One possible option for avoiding excessive traffic growth (which produces noise
and diminishes road safety) might be to set stricter NOx emission quotas while
allowing them to be transferred among hauliers on a market basis: in this case, the
incentive to reduce emissions could be maintained while controlling traffic
growth.  
•  However, tightening emission quotas in order to control traffic growth would
create a gap between the physical basis of the quotas (pollutant emissions) and the
target (traffic) that could give rise to allocational inefficiencies.  An alternative
might be to modify the physical base, in one of two ways: either by combining
NOx emissions and trips, or by replacing NOx emissions by trips. The second
option would have the advantage of keeping the base simple, an indispensable
consideration for a properly functioning system.  It would also do more to foster
use of the rail as an alternative for crossing the country.
2.3.  The ZEV program in California
The ZEV program (Zero Emission Vehicle) now underway seeks to speed up the
introduction of electric vehicles in order to reduce local atmospheric pollution in the
State of California.  It includes a system of credits based on the concept of averaging.
These credits can also be transferred between manufacturers (trading) and over time
(banking).
This case study was chosen rather than the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE)
program because the ZEV program goes further on the way of implementation of TPs
at the level of automakers. CAFE
25 requires automakers to comply with the fuel
economy standards (that is miles per gallon, mpg) set by the US Department of
Transportation. CAFE value is computed by averaging the vehicle standards weighted
                                                









































by vehicle sales. Fines are set at 5.50 USD per tenth of mpg deficit. Since credits can
only be banked or borrowed by the automaker up to three years in order to offset fines
calculated in other years, CAFE can be considered as a non-tradable permits system.
2.3.1.  Context
In the 1970s it was frequent to have more than a hundred smog alerts in the Los
Angeles basin over the course of a year.  A major effort was then made to stiffen
vehicle emissions standards, and emissions have now been reduced by 98 percent.
Smog alerts have declined sharply, to the point where there were none at all in 1999.
The California Environmental Protection Agency, however, has determined  that
further efforts are required.  Today, 95 percent of California residents live in areas
where the air quality does not meet U.S. federal standards.  Cars and trucks are the
second greatest source of atmospheric pollution (accounting for more than 50 percent
of smog precursors).  Some one million vehicles are sold every year in California,
which is the largest automobile market in the United States.
Since VKT are projected to jump tremendously in coming decades, progress in terms
of reducing pollutant emissions
26 from gasoline-powered vehicles is likely to reach a
dead end, since these vehicles will never be completely "clean".  The only solution
would seem to be a general resort to vehicles that produce no emissions, i.e. the ZEV.
The ZEV is defined as having:
•  no tailpipe emissions,  
•  no evaporative emissions,  
•  no emissions from fuel production and handling (i.e. at the refinery or at point-of-
sale), and 
•  no onboard emission control system that might deteriorate over time.
In fact, the only technology that currency meets this standard is the electric vehicle
27.
The California Air Resources Board (CARB), a division of the California
Environmental Protection Agency, is the office responsible for California's air
pollution control program.  The CARB has the legal power to introduce specific
programs as necessary to conform with federal and State clean air legislation, as well
as to supervise local air quality district programs.  It has both the authority and the
responsibility to issue State standards for air quality.  In particular, it has the authority
to regulate road vehicle emissions and other mobile sources.  Finally, it is responsible
for enforcing emission reduction measures adopted by the State.
                                                
26 CO2, the main greenhouse gas, is not considered as a pollutant in this context.
27 Emissions from electric power stations, which represent a limited number of sources, are easier to









































2.3.2.  Program description
28
The first major drive towards a sharp reduction in pollutant emissions from motor
vehicles in California dates from the early 1990s.  From the outset, this program relied
on the principles of averaging-based permits, while setting a highly ambitious
objective for the introduction of electric vehicles.  The program has undergone several
amendments that have taken some of the rigor out of the march towards the ZEV
objective, while maintaining that goal despite pressure from automobile makers.
The 1994 program: annual averaging, trading and banking of credits, and
introduction of ZEVs.
The CARB drew up the LEV I (Low Emission Vehicle) program in 1990.  From the
beginning, the California LEV program was seen as a complement to the federal
exhaust emission reduction program, but one that was more rigorous in terms of its
standards, in the context of the devolution of powers from the federal to the State
level.
The LEV I program was designed both to enforce more rigorous emission standards
and to give automakers greater flexibility in specifications for fuels, pollution control
techniques and type of propulsion.  It came into effect in 1994.
The program made reference to the concept of ZEV, and established four categories
of LEV: the transitional LEVs (TLEVs), LEVs, ULEVs (Ultra LEVs) and the ZEVs.
Each category is defined according to a maximum emissions level for hydrocarbons
(NMOG, non-methane organic gases), carbon monoxide and nitrogen oxides.  The
NMOG index is taken as the reference indicator reflecting total emissions of
atmospheric pollutants.
Instead of requiring every vehicle sold to meet a single emissions standard,
automakers are allowed to spread their fleet among the four vehicle categories and to
conform with the standard on the basis of a weighted average of emission rates for the
entire fleet
29.  They can also earn credits if they are exceeding the required standard,
and they can then sell or bank these credits, or they can purchase credits if their fleet
does not meet the standard.
Finally, a constraint was issued requiring a minimum percentage of ZEVs to be
delivered for sale.  The initial legislation required the 7 most important automakers
(American and Japanese)
30 to ensure that at least 2 percent of their vehicles delivered
for sale in California be ZEVs in 1998, and this percentage was to rise to 5 percent in
2001.
                                                
28  A useful source of information is the CARB web site, at
www.arb.ca.gov/msprog/zevprog/zevprog.htm. The main references used in this section are CARB
(2000a, 2000b, 2001) and Friedman et al (1998).
29 This weighted average is calculated for each automaker by breaking down the vehicle fleet into the
four categories and applying the maximum allowable emission rate to the number of vehicles sold in
each category.
30  Originally General Motors, Ford, Chrysler, Nissan, Honda, Toyota and Mazda. Mazda was









































Given California's leading role in this area, the initiative was taken up by other U.S.
States (Massachusetts, Vermont, Maine and New York), despite several lawsuits
brought by the automakers, and these States also adopted the subsequent amendments,
with some changes.
The 1996 amendment: longer deadlines and voluntary agreements
The automobile and oil industries, along with elected politicians, brought pressure to
amend this legislation, resulting in the March 1996 memorandum of agreement
(MOA): the CARB agreed to push back the 1998 deadline to 2003, but in return it
insisted that the ZEV share of sales should be increased to 10 percent at that date.  As
well, through voluntary agreements negotiated between the CARB and each of the
large volume manufacturers, the latter undertook to produce a certain number of
demonstration vehicles between 1998 and 2000.
Mazda, one of the large volume manufacturers, in which Ford has a one-third interest,
elected to purchase ZEV credits from Ford in order to meet the minimum production
target for demonstration vehicles.
The 1998 LEV II program: introduction of partial ZEV (PZEV) credits.
The regulations were again amended in 1998, in recognition of the difficulties that
automakers are having in producing low-cost ZEV vehicles, and the wide diversity of
technologies available for further reducing emissions (in particular, hybrid electric
vehicles and fuel cell vehicles).  The LEV II program was also given further
flexibility, in the form of partial ZEV credits which could be earned by producing
"very clean" but not strictly ZEV vehicles.
Automakers can earn credits by:
•  making ZEVs available for sale before the 2003 deadline: credits earned in this
way are greater than unity (2 or 3 credits per ZEV prior to 2003, calculated
according to the vehicle’s all-electric operating range and battery charge data); 
•  selling vehicles that, although not strictly ZEV, are sufficiently clean to earn
partial ZEV credits; 
•  purchasing credits from another manufacturer.
Partial ZEV credits are calculated by adding up scores under three headings:
•  First of all, the vehicle must meet a minimum standard in order to earn a PZEV.  It
must be a Super Ultra Low Emission Vehicle (SULEV), i.e. a gasoline-powered
vehicle certified to meet emission standards for 150,000 miles
31 and to produce no
evaporative emissions: such a vehicle earns a credit of 0.2.  
•  Next, a credit is calculated in terms of the vehicle's zero-emission operating range
(i.e. by recharging batteries off the mains); such a vehicle earns a credit of 0.2.  
•  Finally, the NMOG emissions level resulting from the fuel cycle (manufacture,
transport and distribution) is calculated: if this level is less than that of electric
power stations (which is the case with compressed natural gas) the vehicle earns a
credit of 0.2.
                                                
31In order to avoid the deterioration to which conventional vehicles are subject: aging and
contamination of the catalytic converter, malfunctioning of the emissions control system, alterations or










































For example, the PZEV credit will vary from 0.2 for a gasoline-powered SULEV to
one full credit for a hybrid electric SULEV (HEV) with an emission-free operating
range of 100 miles.
Underlying these changes was the CARB's recognition that significant progress has
been made in reducing emissions from SULEVs: because their operating range is
greater than that of electric vehicles, they have the potential for greater market
penetration and thus for reducing emissions more quickly.  The requirement for
150,000 miles of emission-free operation is a further guarantee that SULEVs will
maintain this advantage.
Nevertheless, since there can be no absolute guarantee against the deterioration of
emission control mechanisms, the CARB issued restrictions on these mechanisms: the
large volume manufacturers (those selling more than 35,000 cars and light-duty
vehicles annually in California
32) can meet their 2003 obligation with partial ZEV
credits, but only up to 6 percent of the 10 percent ZEV mandate; the remaining 4
percent must be achieved through sales of actual ZEVs.  Intermediate volume
manufacturers (4,500 to 35,000 vehicles sold annually) can meet the objective entirely
with partial ZEV credits, while the small volume manufacturers are not affected.
In introducing this amendment, the CARB expected that manufacturers would
naturally turn to producing SULEVs as successors to ULEVs.  In fact, this
technological shift is less costly than a move to the electric ZEV, which does not yet
enjoy the same economies of scale as the gasoline-powered vehicle.  Moreover, by
producing SULEVs, manufacturers can reduce the average NMOG index of their
individual fleets, which provides a further incentive to making SULEVs instead of
ZEVs.
To the end of 2000, only the Nissan Sentra (a SULEV), introduced in November
1999, had been certified for PZEV credits.  Three other SULEVs introduced in 1999
and 2000 have yet to obtain this certification (because of other criteria, in particular
the problem of evaporative emissions).
The 2000 review: deadlines confirmed and further flexibility
The 1996 agreement called for automakers to produce 3,750 ZEVs between 1998 and
2000.  Thanks to the credits earned through the introduction of advanced batteries,
this commitment was reduced to 1,800 electric vehicles.  In 2000 there were about
2,300 electric vehicles on California roads but, despite growing consumer interest and
a subsidy of US$5,000 to manufacturers for every ZEV sold, those automakers who
reached their quota under this agreement have virtually ceased production.  There are
two essential reasons behind this “black out”: cost, naturally enough, but also
uncertainty in the absence of a clearly identified market and a definitive regulatory
signal from the State of California.
Under the 1996 agreement, carmakers were to provide the CARB with confidential
data on their production plans for meeting their 2003 obligations.  According to
CARB these plans showed that all automakers have the technical capacity to produce
                                                









































vehicles in the required quantities.  Yet all of them argued that the production costs of
these vehicles were still high and that the limited operating range of electric vehicles,
given the foreseeable state of battery technology, would prohibit any sustainable mass
market for such vehicles by that date.
Moreover, during the 2000 debate over the program, some manufacturers declared
that they were unable to make full use of the opportunities offered by the PZEV
option because they could not produce vehicles in sufficient quantity.  This meant that
these manufacturers' production of pure ZEVs will have to exceed the required 4
percent minimum.
The 2003 ZEV target was again confirmed by the CARB in January 2001, following
the biennial review of the program in 2000, but further amendments were introduced
to reduce the cost of the program to manufacturers.  The principal changes are as
follows:
•  the required number of "pure" ZEVs is reduced by half in the first years of the
program; this number may be reduced further for manufacturers producing other
kinds of very clean vehicles; 
•  the ZEV credit multiplier for an pre-2003 ZEV sale is increased to 4 for sale in
2001-2002 (compared to 2 to 3 before) and to 1.25 for sale in 2003-2005; 
•  the number of vehicles needed to obtain PZEV credits in the first years is also
reduced; 
•  on the other hand, the 2003 mandate of 10 percent for ZEVs or equivalent credits
is increased in stages to 16 percent by 2018.
The result is that manufacturers must produce between 4,650 and 15,450 electric
vehicles in 2003, depending on which of the various options they select.  The
authorities also decided to include sport utility vehicles (SUVs), pickups and light
vans, as of 2007, in calculating the required percentage of ZEVs, thereby increasing
the calculation base by 50 percent.
According to the CARB, the savings to manufacturers resulting from these changes to
the program, compared to its previous version, will amount to between $130 million
and $400 million by 2003, depending on the option selected.  The CARB has also
established an $18 million subsidy fund for consumers as an incentive to purchase or
lease ZEVs (up to a total of US$9,000 for a three-year lease prior to 2003, and up to
US$5,000 after 2003): these subsidies are in addition to other local or federal
incentives.
Content, nature and calculation of ZEV credits
Automakers who offer more ZEVs for sale than required in any model year will earn
ZEV credits.  The ZEV credits are expressed in grams of NMOG per mile.  They are
calculated by subtracting the number of ZEVs required from the number of ZEVs
delivered for sale, and multiplying this balance by the average NMOG emission
standards required for the manufacturer's light-vehicle fleet (cars and light-duty
trucks).  As well, a credit multiplier can be earned for vehicles delivered for sale prior









































A manufacturer can comply with regulations by submitting a certain number of ZEV
credits, either earned previously or acquired from another manufacturer.  The number
of credits required is calculated in the same manner as before.
A manufacturer offering fewer than the required number of ZEVs for sale in any
model year must make up the deficit before the end of the following model year, by
submitting a certain number of credits.  Any manufacturer that fails to offer the
required number of ZEVs, or to submit the required number of credits, without
making up the deficit within the specified time limit, will be subject to a fine under
the Health and Safety Code.  This fine applies to any manufacturer selling a new
motorised vehicle not compliant with the State emission standards, and amounts to
US$5,000 per non-conforming vehicle.  The number of non-conforming vehicles is
calculated in terms of the ZEV credit deficit.
It has been suggested that the option of paying a fine should be eliminated, and that
the manufacturer should be forced to make up any credit deficit by purchasing credits
from another manufacturer.  The CARB has rejected this proposal, since the
manufacturer could then be faced with paying an exorbitant price to other
manufacturers for such credits.  A maximum price for credits is then established,
equal to the amount of the fine established in the regulations.
Program management
All automakers, except for those in the "small volume" category, are subject to the
ZEV mandate and are required therefore to participate in the credit program.
As noted in the introduction, the CARB, as a State agency, has full authority to
establish objectives and standards and to implement the credit system, within the
framework of federal and State clean-air legislation.  The CARB is also responsible
for certifying vehicles and verifying the credits submitted by manufacturers.
On the other hand, participating manufacturers have full freedom in negotiating credit
transfers.
2.3.3.  Assessment
Our assessment relates to estimates of operating costs and the advantages expected of
the program.  Next we present a summary of the positions of the various stakeholders
in the debate over the program's evolution.
Operating costs of the program
The administrative cost of the program itself includes the CARB's measurement and
monitoring of pollutant emissions, tracking new developments in engine and battery
technologies, and verifying the credits submitted by manufacturers.  Among these
costs, only the last one is specific to the credit program, the others being an inherent
part of any regulatory system.  In the absence of more accurate data, it can be










































Costs relating to accelerated introduction of electric vehicles
In contrast, the costs flowing from the accelerated market introduction of electric
vehicles are quite another matter.  The CARB (2000a) has estimated the incremental
initial cost in 2003 of producing electric, hybrid or PZEV vehicles (vehicle, battery
and charger) and the total life-cycle incremental cost per mile travelled
33, compared to
the baseline SULEV vehicle.  These calculations involve a number of assumptions
about the trends in battery technologies and costs, the costs of specific vehicle
components and recharge equipment, electricity prices, gasoline prices, vehicle
performance, maintenance costs, and inflation and discount rates.
The all-in incremental cost of the battery-powered electric vehicle compared to the
conventional vehicle in 2003 ranges from US$7,500 for a "city EV" to US$20,000 for
a freeway-capable vehicle.  Most of this incremental cost relates to the batteries.  By
comparison, the incremental cost of a hybrid vehicle is US$3,300, and for a PZEV,
US$500.  On a per-mile basis, the incremental cost ranges from US$0.082 for a 4-
passenger PZEV to US$0.27 for a 4-passenger battery-powered EV.  The extra cost of
battery-powered vehicles remains significant even under different assumptions
involving higher gasoline prices or longer battery life.  Only when volume production
is reached (more than 100,000 vehicles per year) will high-efficiency electric battery-
powered vehicles achieve costs per mile comparable to those of hybrid vehicles or
PZEVs, which will by then be regarded as standard vehicles.
During the three-year period covered by the 1996 agreement (i.e., from 1998 to 2000),
electric vehicles sold in California benefited from a buy-down grant of US$5,000 paid
to the manufacturers, and financed in equal proportions by the California Energy
Commission and by the local air pollution control districts.  Manufacturers applied the
subsidy as a discount to their ZEV lease or purchase price.  In addition to this subsidy,
an $18 million consumer incentive program was introduced in 2000.
Expected benefits
The CARB (2000a) has estimated reductions in both direct and indirect
34 vehicle
emissions in the South Coast Air Basin by 2010, depending on market penetration by
battery vehicles, hybrid and gasoline PZEVs, and SULEVs.  The emissions
considered are hydrocarbon compounds (NMOG), oxides of nitrogen (NOx) and toxic
air contaminants.
Per-vehicle emissions of NMOG compounds from battery vehicles are 96 percent
lower than those of the cleanest gasoline vehicle (PZEV SULEV).  Other reductions
include 88 percent for NOx and 86 percent for toxic air contaminants (compared to a
hybrid PZEV).
Total (fleet-wide) emissions are estimated for 2010, exclusively for the light vehicle
fleet sold between 2003 and 2010, and using different electric vehicle penetration
scenarios, with a maximum of 10 percent.  The analysis shows that the advantage in
terms of air quality is fairly low compared to a base scenario in which no battery
vehicles are sold (maximum reduction of 1.91 tons of pollutant per day compared to
total emissions of 25.45 tons per day in the base scenario).  Only under a scenario
                                                
33 Total production and operating costs assuming ten-year lifetime miles traveled of 117,000.









































where 50 percent of all vehicles on the road were ZEVs by the year 2020 would direct
daily emissions be reduced by 30 percent at that time.
The benefits are thus essentially long-term ones, reflecting the time that will be
needed for electric vehicles to achieve significant market penetration.
The program has sparked intensive research and development efforts by federal
agencies and private business, reflected in the filing of many patents: from 1982 to
1991 the number of patents relating to electric vehicle technology averaged about
seven per year, and was declining despite federal funding.  Yet this rate rose to more
than 50 patents in 1994, the year the LEV I program came into effect, and then to
more than 80 per year between 1996 and 1998.
A further advantage lies in the diversification that the ZEV mandate will bring in
terms of energy supply.
In terms of CO2 emissions, the performance of electric vehicles depends on the way
electric energy is produced.  Currently, an electric vehicle powered relying on
electricity produced in California emits about 250 g/mile of CO2, compared to 300
g/mile for conventional gasoline vehicles
35.  This advantage is less obvious, however,
in comparison to a diesel or natural gas vehicle (less than 270 g/mile) and disappears
completely when compared to a latest-generation hybrid vehicle.
The positions of the different stakeholders in the debate
Stakeholders in this debate fall into three broad categories, namely the automakers,
the fuel industry, and environmentalists.
Although they have not been presenting a united front, the automobile manufacturers
are primarily concerned by what they see as excessive interference in their affairs and
an imposed obligation to produce vehicles at a loss.  They argue that by introducing
partial credits (PZEV), the CARB has implicitly recognised that there is no market for
ZEVs and is therefore providing a means to circumvent the regulations.  According to
them, the CARB should admit this and abolish the ZEV mandate.  In response, the
CARB insists that it will not withdraw the ZEV mandate and that PZEV credits are a
way of allowing manufacturers greater flexibility and encouraging the nascent ZEV
industry.
The oil industry has no interest in the ZEV mandate, which represents a threat to its
business.  It has therefore opposed the program strongly.
On the other hand, the natural gas industry finds the PZEV system very interesting,
because it can produce fuel for SULEV vehicles.
                                                
35 Or 155 grams of CO2 per kilometer, for the electric vehicle.  In Europe, the voluntary agreement
negotiated by the European Automobile Manufacturers' Association (ACEA) with the European Union
calls for average emissions of 140 g CO2/kilometer for new vehicles sold in 2008, a less ambitious










































The electricity industry is torn between disappointment over the lower required
percentage of ZEVs, which means lower future demand for electricity, and the hope
of increasing sales through the compression of natural gas.
Environmentalists are divided between those who think that this further flexibility will
reduce opposition to the 2003 regulatory deadline, and those who think that allowing
credits for gasoline vehicles, even those that are "ultraclean", will end up contributing
to increase of total pollution.
Another problem relates to small and intermediate volume automakers that are
majority-owned by another manufacturer.  The consolidation process that has been
underway in the automobile industry in recent years has tended to undermine the
CARB's classification of manufacturers by sales volume (large, intermediate and
small).  Small volume manufacturers are not subject to the minimum ZEV sales
percentage, while intermediate manufacturers can meet their obligation entirely
through PZEV credits.  CARB staff proposed in 2001 that the sales of 2 or more
manufacturers should be aggregated if one of them has more than a 50 percent interest
in the other(s).  This aggregation would become effective in 2003, and its implications
for classification and the resulting ZEV obligations would be taken into account from
2006.
2.3.4.  Conclusions and comment
It is difficult to say today whether the program is a success, because its full measure
cannot be taken until 2003.  Till mid-2001, credit transfers have been limited to
meeting automakers' voluntary commitment to produce demonstration vehicles over
the period 1998-2000 (e.g. the transfer of credits between Ford and Mazda).
From the viewpoint of implementing systems of transferable permits among
automakers, the California example shows that such a system is quite feasible,
because incremental administrative costs are low in comparison to a conventional
regulatory program.  It is on this point that we find the most proposals in the literature
on CO2 emissions certificates (Wang 1994, Albrecht 2000).
The real difficulty in the California ZEV program has been, and remains, to get the
automakers to disclose the real costs of research, development and production for
electric vehicles.  This is, in effect, a classic case of information asymmetry between a
public regulator and private economic agents.  The disclosure process is not specific
to the ZEV credits program, but rather inherent in any industrial regulation policy.  It
takes strong political will at every turn to find a politically acceptable compromise
with the automakers, and that political will must be backed up by a public opinion that
is sensitive to local atmosphere pollution.
If we consider the issue of aggregate pollutant and CO2 emissions reduction, which
are not the primary objective of the ZEV program in itself, some considerations can
be put forward with regard to the potentials of this kind of program.
In the face of emissions resulting from automobile travel, the policy choice has been









































Significant progress has thus been made in terms of total emissions, but reducing
emissions from gasoline vehicles has now reached its limit.  Future improvements will
come more slowly, and will depend on the speed with which electric alternatives
suitable for the mass market can be developed.  It is unclear whether progress might
have been swifter if efforts had focused on reducing automobile travel, but such
efforts would have run up against serious social resistance, given the fundamental role
of this form of mobility in American society.
Moreover, the shift from very clean gasoline vehicles to electric vehicles is a risk that
local pollution hotspots be only moved from urbanised areas to areas where electricity
is produced if it is based upon charcoal or oil, despite it is easier to limit emissions
from a point source. This shift also does nothing to address the issue of CO2
emissions, given the way electricity is produced in California, but that was not the
objective of the program. This suggests that, from the viewpoint of reducing unit CO2
emissions, an all-out drive towards electric vehicles is perhaps not the best strategy.
However, by sharply reducing emissions from SULEV and hybrid vehicles, the
program has been indirectly responsible for significant progress in terms of per-
vehicle CO2 emissions from internal combustion vehicles.  
2.4.  Exploring new approaches in France
A working group of the National Transportation Council, an advisory body on
transport policy in France, has been exploring potential applications of decentralised
systems of transferable permits in the transportation sector.
After examining the context in which this work has been undertaken, this paper
describes the approaches adopted, together with the principal points of debate.
2.4.1.  The context
At the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio, and later at the 1997 Kyoto Conference, the
European Union committed itself to an 8 percent reduction in greenhouse gases
(GHG) over the period 2008-2012, compared to 1990, and subsequently issued
“bubble regulations” distributing the required effort among its member States.
Accordingly, France is to reduce emissions to their 1990 level over the period 2008-
2012.
Among greenhouse gas-emitting activities in France, the transportation sector is seen
not only as having the most significant emissions (22 percent of GHG in 1997) but as
presenting the greatest threat, by far, of higher future emissions: 10.3 percent higher
in 2010, compared to low growth or even decline in other sectors
36.  In the
transportation sector, GHG emissions are produced primarily by the combustion of
                                                
36  A specific feature of France's energy supply is the already very high share of nuclear electric
generation, which produces no GHG but generates radioactive wastes.  Consequently, France has










































fuels in road transport (84.3 percent of the sector's emissions in 1997), and in a
subsidiary manner by air transport (10.8 percent, including international refuelling
tanks).
Kyoto represents a first, and modest, stage of reductions (- 5 percent world-wide),
which is to be followed by further stages for which more drastic reduction targets
must be defined.  The question of the transport sector's responsibility for GHG
emissions, compared to other sectors of activity, thus arises.  Should the transportation
sector be allowed to continue with growing emissions, while other sectors are called
upon to make additional efforts, or should ways be sought to curb transport activity?
The potential advantages of regulation and supply-side policies have been widely
explored in a report on the French program to combat climate change
37.  Other
incentive mechanisms involve economic instruments, taxation on one hand, and
transferable permits on the other hand, which have the advantage, compared to other
mechanisms, of minimising the total cost to society of reducing emissions.
With respect to taxation, the currently proposed level of the carbon tax, an average of
0.07 euro per litre of fuel, represents about 7 percent of the final price paid by the
consumer for super-grade gasoline.  In other words, current automotive fuel taxes are
7 to 10 times higher than the proposed carbon tax.  The behavioural effect of a carbon
tax at this level is likely to be very weak.  If there were to be a more stringent "post
Kyoto" tightening of objectives, the tax would have to be raised sharply: it would
have to be at least three times as high, ceteris paribus, in order to achieve a reduction
of 10 percent in automotive fuel consumption, given what we know about fuel price
elasticities.  The tax hike would have to be even higher if accelerating economic
growth, such as we have had recently, were to increase mobility, and hence fuel
consumption, through the income effect.
The "tax revolt" of September 2000, on the heels of sharp oil price hikes in 1999 and
2000, forged a coalition of road users, private or professional, farmers and fishermen,
and forced the government to make concessions on fuel taxation. This experience
shows that a drastic increase in such taxation is sure to encounter social and political
obstacles.
Moreover, the speed and the magnitude of last oil price increase in 1999-2000 suggest
the possibility of an equally swift and severe collapse in this price, net of taxes, as
reflected recently.  Under such a scenario, the price effect of a carbon tax would be
completely wiped out.
In the face of these arguments, and given the difficulties in controlling the effective
final price and the doubtful acceptability of imposing a further levy on a product that
is already heavily taxed, a working group undertook to explore further the feasibility
of introducing decentralised markets for permits in the transportation sector, within
France or in Europe.  The working group originated in the National Transportation
Council and brought together representatives of users and the transportation industry,
as well as outside experts (CNT, 2001).
                                                
37 See “ Programme National de Lutte contre le Changement Climatique 2000/2010", Interministerial









































Because they represent a new departure in terms of the transportation sector
38, the
ideas put forth by the working group as to the operational nature of transferable
permit systems in the transportation sector do not represent definitive conclusions.
Rather, they suggest routes for further exploration and evaluation, primarily from a
qualitative viewpoint: the final diagnosis will require more exhaustive study.
As well, the fact that some areas of the transportation industry (e.g. road hauling) are
exposed to vigorous international competition means that any measures affecting
them would have to be harmonised throughout the European Union, as a minimum.
2.4.2.  New approaches explored by the working group
The group immediately found itself facing a trade-off in attempting to design a set of
economic instruments for reducing emissions from multiple mobile sources.  On the
one hand, a more effective incentive to emission-reducing behavioural change could
be obtained by applying the permits downstream in the fuel cycle, as close as possible
to the final consumer, rather than increasing fuel taxes (see below the discussion on
effectiveness of price-signal). On the other hand, if the intent is to minimise the
reduction program's administrative costs, given the existing fuel tax system, then the
permits should apply upstream in the fuel distribution process.
The working group therefore explored several different approaches:
•  An "upstream" system, where the permits are applied to producers and importers
of fossil fuels: such a system has the advantage of covering all points of
consumption (and not just the transportation sector).  It could also be combined
with "downstream" application, involving businesses that are bulk consumers of
energy.  
•  A set of "downstream" permits involving both private and public agents in
passenger transportation.  The agents examined, in turn, are public passenger
carriers, the local transportation authorities, automakers and private motorists.  
•  A set of "downstream" permits involving road transportation of goods.
All of these approaches are summarised in Table 1 and Table 2, showing in each case
the physical basis of the permits (or the intended target), the initial allocation, the
trading mechanism, and the major advantages and drawbacks.
In most cases, except for the transport authorities and automakers, the physical basis
is the carbon content in the fuel consumed, and the permits would apply to fuel by the
litre (proportionately as a function of the carbon content of each type of fuel, gasoline
or diesel). This arrangement allows for wide trading, extending to sectors other than
transportation.  Assuring broad coverage for the permits market is a way to achieve
distributional optimisation of the permit price, and hence to diminish the cost of the
reduction to the various agents (see below).
                                                
38 Apart from proposals for emission permits for new vehicles, involving automakers (see this section









































The quota principle (cap and trade) was adopted in each case, except that involving
automakers, where averaging was selected, based on target CO2 value in grams per
kilometre.
Free allocation of permits was adopted in all cases, in order to make each system
socially more acceptable.  For road carriers of goods or passengers, the level of this
allocation would be similar to that of the fuel tax exemptions in place today.  For
private motorists, the basis of allocation could vary in light of social equity objectives:
this could involve allocations to individuals and not only motorists
39.
Of course, with downstream permits, there is the issue of the costs of introducing and
managing the system, which have been described for the time being only in
qualitative terms.  To moderate the impact of these costs, permit transactions and
verification should be closely integrated with the current fuel retailing system based
on the use of bankcards.  These costs would include:
•  Changing the software loaded in the automatic bankcard devices on the fuel
pumps, to recognise the permits system (checking the balance, debiting accounts).  
•  The manufacture and distribution of "smart cards", or integration of microcoding
software into existing smart bankcards as they come up for renewal.  
•  A specific information campaign for launching the new system (in addition to the
campaign that would undoubtedly have to be undertaken before introducing any
emissions control measure).
Finally, the trading mechanism raises the question of the degree of openness of the
market on which agents are to trade their permits: should it be sector-specific
(transportation) or inter-sectoral, should it be domestic or international?
                                                
39 A similar proposal was made by a “popular initiative” in Switzerland in March 2000, aiming at
cutting road traffic by half. An “ecobonus” was proposed that is to say a levy charged on car utilization
and reimbursed to the population at large in equal shares. Those who travel more than the average









































Physical basis Initial allocation  Trading mechanisms Advantages Drawbacks
Upstream permits
Carbon introduced into the




Purchase of permits on the
international market
Trading with other
participants on an open
permits market*





If allocation is free: 
- price signal may be less
effective (marginal price of
the permit is “drowned” in
the price to the final
consumer);
- need for a subsequent tax
on operators’ profits
Downstream permits applied to goods transportation
Trucking operators Carbon in fuel consumed
by trucks hauling goods
(e.g. permits per litre of
diesel)
Free flat annual allocation
identical for all vehicles
Trading among participants







* An “open permits market” is a broad permits market that extends to the entire transportation sector or other economic sectors, and operates at the national, European or
even world level.









































Physical basis Initial allocation  Trading mechanisms Advantages Drawbacks
Downstream permits applied to passenger transportation
Road passenger
transportation operators
Carbon in fuel consumed
by commercial passenger
vehicles (e.g. permit per
litre of diesel)
Free flat annual allocation
identical for all vehicles
Trading among operators
or with other participants







to offer similar incentive
for private cars. Need to
involve the transportation
authorities
Transportation authorities Urban GHG emissions






Trading on an open permits
market*











Automakers Unit vehicle CO2 emissions
(e.g. grams of CO2/km)
Free flat annual allocation
identical for all vehicles
sold, against a target set by
the authorities (averaging
principle)




limited by the small
number of participantss
Market is limited to
automakers. 
Risk of distorting world
trade if market is restricted
to the European Union.
Private motorists Carbon in fuel consumed
by private cars (permits per
litre of fuel)
Free flat annual allocation
identical for all vehicles.
Trading among participants








* An “open permits market” is a broad permits market that extends to the entire transportation sector or other economic sectors, and operates at the national, European or
even world level.









































What should be the scope of the permits market?
This issue raises two points, one regarding the effectiveness of transfers, the other
regarding the control of effort specifically made by the transport sector.
The effectiveness of transfers is the basic condition for minimising total reduction
cost and depends on the heterogeneity of reduction costs among participants. This
heterogeneity would be particularly effective regarding the different potential
adaptations of mobility between private motorists living in dense urbanised areas and
those living in rural areas: in that case a specific and closed market restricted to
private motorists may be effective from this point of view. Regarding transportation
authorities, since they generally have the same profile of density and modal split
within each country or even region, the effectiveness of transfer
40 would imply their
participation to broader market involving other kind of participants. This is all the
more true for road passenger or trucking operators: one obvious idea would be to
involve rail operators, which seems however difficult (see below).
In the case of a domestic market restricted to the transport sector, the level of prices
on that market would indicate their relative scarcity and make it possible to anticipate
future adjustments.  For example, the greater the total number of permits initially
allocated, the lower their price will be.  Conversely, if the number allocated is too
low, the price of the permits will be high, but it could be capped at a tax “t”, at which
price the regulatory authority would redeem the permits.
Through a comparison of the permit price on the domestic transport sector market
with that of carbon-referenced permits on a domestic or international inter-sectoral
market, the relative effort being made in the transportation sector can be compared to
that of other sectors.  If its effort is inadequate, this means that other sectors will have
to make up the gap, or that the regulatory authority will have to finance it by
purchasing permits on international market.
By keeping the market closed, the regulatory authority can thus decide to shift the
burden to one sector rather than another, for social or political reasons.  Generally
speaking, if permit allocation is too restrictive or too lax, or if the tax “t” is not
properly calculated, the marginal costs of reducing CO2 emissions will not be
equalised across sectors.  Such distortions reduce the effectiveness of the system.
They can therefore be regarded only as transitional measures.
The market for tradable permits should thus ultimately be an open one, i.e. all emitters
of GHG in a country's different economic sectors should be able to trade their rights,
even internationally.
The tax-versus-permits debate
It is clear that the least costly mechanism, in terms of introducing and administering
it, is to extend current fossil fuel taxation to take account of the carbon tax concept.
The administrative cost criterion, however, needs to be looked at in light of two other
criteria: the incentive for behavioural change, and public acceptability.  Here, the
system of transferable permits with free allocation has some undeniable advantages.
                                                









































First there is the incentive factor: agents selling their unused permits receive an
immediate and tangible monetary benefit.  And in terms of acceptability, the system
avoids placing a further fiscal burden on a product that is already heavily taxed.
One of the major challenges in designing permit systems is how best to reduce
implementation and transaction costs.  Only by assessing the total cost of reduction
(i.e. implementation, administration and transaction costs plus reduction costs borne
by the participants in the system, less eventual fiscal revenues), and adding in the
social and political cost of the measure, is it possible to choose one mechanism over
the other, or a combination of both (taxation and permits).
The debate over the effectiveness of price signals and their point of application
In analysing the effectiveness of price signals, we must start from the perspective of
changing behaviour by inducing different agents to reduce their consumption through
different means and to different levels: individual agents will reduce their
consumption to the point where the cost of the last unit of pollution emitted is equal to
the advantage derived from the activity producing that unit.  Permits and taxes thus
have exactly the same marginal effect on the agent to whom the permit or tax is
applied.
Depending on where the permit is applied in the fuel cycle (production, distribution
and consumption), the system's effectiveness will differ depending on whether the
permits are handed out initially free of charge.  If permits are auctioned, the price
signal will in principle be fully transmitted to the final consumer.
On the other hand, if upstream permits are distributed free there is a risk that as the
original price signal from the permits is transmitted through the producers, it will
simply be averaged into costs, and will thus be lost sight of (“drowned”) in the price
of fuel to the final consumer.  If the price signal is in effect blurred, the transportation
sector may well end up purchasing reduction credits from other sectors, or from
abroad, at greater cost for the community than it would have incurred through its own
efforts.
This suggests that, if we want the transportation sector to reduce its emissions, and if
permits are to be distributed free for reasons of public acceptance, the permits system
should be decentralised downstream, rather than confined upstream.  This in turn
means applying the permit, as far as possible, at the point where it is most likely to
effect behavioural change: to motorists, for example, who may decide to modify their
travel habits, or to transport operators, who can revise their business plans.
2.4.3.  Conclusions and comment
To bring consistency to the various approaches explored, we must focus on the
mechanism for co-ordinating the efforts of the participants involved.
Whether we are speaking of the system of upstream permits or a series of downstream
permit systems, the concept of carbon content offers a common unit of allocation and









































co-ordination among the participants and to make the permits as universally tradable
as possible with other sectors, which is a condition for minimising the total cost of
reduction.
In contrast, the mechanism proposed for the automakers does not allow emissions per
kilometre to be converted into CO2 permits.  Yet the variety of vehicle models and the
diversity of automakers, with the differing adaptation costs they imply, should make
for a reasonable level of trading within this sector
41.
What the local transport authorities must do, as we have seen, is to develop a
mechanism for calculating emissions from routine or commuter travel in their areas of
jurisdiction.  Under this condition, the results can be translated directly into CO2
permits, and the universal market for permits could then be accessed.
As for road operators, their market suffers from destructive competition of a
multiplicity of small operators and they feel themselves threatened by opening of the
EU to lower-wage countries. Thus they are in a weak position when negotiating prices
with those who demand transport services. Why not involve the latter in a permit
scheme? The extension of the downstream permits previously designed to those who
demand transport services is impossible, given the way sendings are managed by
hauliers: a same vehicle can be used within a single tour to serve different clients. It
would be then impossible to fairly allocate the quotas to the clients. An alternative
option would be targeting big shippers (e.g. distributors) and involve them in
voluntary agreements. This could be a first step to get more information on the
potentials of emission reductions by the shippers before implementing more
incentives.
Finally, it has proven difficult, with these downstream permit systems, to incorporate
rail carriers, whose energy requirements are mainly in the form electricity.  In fact, the
only way of bringing them in would be to design a different type of permits system
where the initial allocation would be calculated using an efficiency standard prorated
for the service provided (either in passenger-km, in the case of passenger travel, or
tons-km, for the transport of goods).  In such a program, rail operators would be net
sellers to road transport operators.  This option, however, has not yet shown itself
feasible, since service provided is measured only by surveys, and these are unlikely to
withstand a legal challenge.
One possible solution to the problem of integrating rail operators into the permits
system based on carbon consumption would be for the regulatory authority to set an
overall carbon consumption quota for the subsector concerned (passenger or goods
carriers, rail and road).  A portion of the quota would then be distributed as a basic
allocation to rail operators, prorated to the service they provide, and the remainder
would go to road carriers of goods, using the mechanism described in Table 1.  Road
operators needing permits would then buy them from rail operators. Jancovici (2001)
has estimated the value of the permits that the SNCF (the French national railway)
could sell at 300 millions euros a year, with a ton of carbon at 76 euros.
                                                
41 The literature has examples of proposals for permits to automakers, combining unit emissions and
kilometer traveled by vehicles (Albrecht, 2000; Winkelman et al, 2000) or even vehicle ownership









































Any shift from control based primarily on taxes to one based on rationing by
imposing rigorous quotas on final consumers would represent a real social shock,
involving a resource that is essential to present-day lifestyles in developed countries,
and for which there is no credible substitute over the medium term, at least in some
situations.  Dealing with this shock remains a major challenge.
As for the consequences of this work, it could be said that it has essentially an
educational role to play towards both the transport operators and the administration in
charge of transport activity. The main operators concerned, road hauliers and airlines,
are currently in difficult economic situations: for road operators this has already been
mentioned and for airlines this stems from strong world competition and current
slowing down of demand growth. In this context it is difficult for them to consider
control of their activity either by reinforcing the current fuel taxes (even
implementing them for aviation) or introducing TPs. On the other side the
administration faced a “fuel tax revolt” in September 2000 which shows that the
conventional instrument reaches its limits. There is recognition of the need to find
ways to get out of this environmental deadlock. This work has contributed to open the
debate and to give an impulse to research on introduction of TPs within the sector.
3.  CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS
Feasible systems: protecting environmentally sensitive areas and
reducing unit vehicle emissions
A system of permits applied to traffic of mobile sources in limited geographic areas is
technically feasible at an acceptable financial cost, as the Ecopoint program in Austria
has shown.  In technical terms, this system is similar to ongoing or near future
electronic road pricing systems and could be added to at low cost.
Such a system would seem, a priori, to be adequate for protecting sensitive areas of
the local environment (pollution, noise, road safety).  The demonstrated limitations of
the Ecopoint program, inherent in its original design, suggest that if the vehicles
involved are to be covered fully the protected region must be one where points of
entry and exit are few and readily controllable.  A trade-off would have to be found
between the number of points to be controlled and the size of the area to be protected.
Of course such TPs market focussed at geographic areas (one market for one area)
would need the participation of operators of other modes such as rail in order to
benefit from heterogeneity of reduction costs and to foster new modal split. Similar
potential systems such as “CO2 credit card” and linked rail-road transit permits
(LRRTP) are briefly described in the OECD-EST study on Alpine freight transport
(OECD, 1999).
The California ZEV program, although it will become significant only in the near
future, shows that a system of credits applied to unit vehicle emissions and tradable
among automakers is quite feasible: its incremental administrative costs are in fact
negligible compared to the normal expense of monitoring and enforcing regulations.









































The importance of these criteria for transferable permit programs in general has long
been recognised.  Their validity first became apparent in an analysis of the conditions
for success with the gasoline lead phase-down program in the United States (Hahn
and Hester, 1989). This finding is reinforced by an analysis of Austria's Ecopoint
program and California's ZEV program.  In all three cases, the physical basis is
clearly identified (grams of lead per gallon, grams of NOx per kilowatt-hour, and
grams of NMOG per mile, respectively).
The simplicity criterion relates to the rules for managing transfers, which must be
facilitated as much as possible if the theoretical advantages of the tradable nature of
the permits are to be fully realised.  This is the case with the lead reduction program
and the ZEV program, where there is no need for the regulatory authority to become
involved in trading among program participants
42.
The pragmatism criterion relates to the design of the program: its various aspects must
be able to evolve in light of discrepancies that may emerge between objectives and
cumulative understanding of the adaptation costs borne by program participants.
Some good examples of such pragmatism can be found in the lead phase-down
program, with its different trading and banking phases, and in the ZEV program,
where changes to the credit formulas provide automakers with more opportunities to
adapt.
On the contrary, such pragmatism would seem to be lacking in the Ecopoint program
which, at least in its current configuration, is in something of a crisis.  If a program
like this were to be established for the European Union, any amendment would
require reaching agreement among the member States, the difficulty of which is
readily apparent given their divergent interests.
It is all the more obvious that pragmatism is only possible when the regulatory
authority enjoys strong political support, and has sufficiently broad powers.
Political will and possibilities for low-cost adaptation
If a regulatory authority is to negotiate successfully with market participants who are
often organised in professional groupings with means for exerting considerable
political pressure, that authority will have to have effective powers, backed by a
strong political commitment.
When low-cost adaptation is possible there is less need for strong political will. This
was the case with the gasoline lead reduction program, since there were affordable
technological solutions available for replacing lead, and the consumption of leaded
gasoline was already on a downward track because of renewal of the automobile fleet.
On the opposite, the commitment of public power will have to be all the stronger if
the range of low-cost adaptation possibilities is limited.  An analysis of the ZEV
program shows that the dynamic equilibrium between political will and pressures
from the automakers has been a constant factor in the program's development.  The
                                                









































1996 reform, which pushed back the ZEV deadline from 1998 to 2003 and established
a voluntary agreement, was interpreted by some as a victory for the automobile
manufacturers, whose arguments about the number of industry jobs at stake found a
certain political resonance.  On the other hand, ecological pressure groups, buoyed up
by strong public sensitivity to local air pollution, weighed in heavily in public debate
over the program, and in keeping the CARB to its ZEV objectives.
It has been argued that there is no proof o f  su ch  p o li tic al w il l w h en  i t co m es to
reducing greenhouse gas emissions, or, at least, that whatever will exists may be
insufficient in light of the scope of the changes required.  There is no doubt that public
opinion is becoming increasingly aware of the gravity of the situation.  Yet because
the consequences of climate change are seen as far off and to some extent uncertain,
and the social costs of imposing abrupt lifestyle changes in developed countries are
deemed unacceptable, the required policy decisions have been delayed.
What role can transferable permits play in GHG reduction programs in
transportation sector?
As noted in our analysis of the California ZEV program, technical advances with
gasoline engines are reaching their limit, and the electric vehicle is not likely to offer
a suitable alternative for significantly reducing CO2 emissions, given the way
electricity is currently produced.
Governments cannot, therefore, rely on unit vehicle emissions for reaching CO2
reduction objectives, but will instead have to focus on vehicle use.  The various
incentives available for influencing demand are taxes, permits, or a combination of
both.
The terms of the debate are now clear. Tax and permit systems have the same
allocation efficiency. Since fuel taxes are already in place, extending them to a CO2
tax would be less costly to administer for multiple mobile sources than a system of
permits applied to those sources. 
However these duties would have to be much higher than they are at present if they
were to meet the objective of reducing emissions. The "tax revolt" experienced in
September 2000 in several European countries, as sharply higher oil prices pushed up
gasoline prices that were already highly taxed, highlights the limits on public
acceptance of significant further increases in these taxes.
On the other side, permits allocated free of charge are seen by agents as a means of
avoiding an additional tax. Moreover agents selling their unused permits receive an
immediate and tangible monetary benefit. These are arguments in favour of a
potentially greater acceptability of permits with free allocation when compared to new
taxes.
For this reason, new approaches have been explored for downstream decentralisation
of permits in the transportation sector as a possible alternative to CO2 taxation
43.  This
                                                










































would be a way of seizing the advantages of permits, namely the certainty of
achieving the quantitative objective and the further incentive to final consumers to
reduce emissions that is inherent in allowing them to sell any unused permits.
Moreover, these downstream permits have been designed with a physical basis that is
simple and fungible: they can be fully integrated into wider permit systems targeting
all sources other than transport, i.e. national and even international markets for CO2
permits.
Nevertheless, this option poses the formidable question of administrative costs, not to
mention the social and political challenge of introducing what could well be seen as a
form of rationing.
These considerations point to at least four routes for further research:
•  Designing downstream permits systems to keep administrative costs to a
minimum, as outlined in the preceding sections: technical progress with onboard
electronics over the last 20 years has made it possible to introduce systems that
would have been previously inconceivable, such as electronic tolls or Ecopoints,
and that now hold significant promise for addressing this question.  
•  Examining the social and political feasibility of such a rationing program.  
•  Simulating the operation of downstream permits markets (e.g. trading over-the-
counter or on a stock exchange), which could also give indications on possible
market power and price distortion effects.  
•  Assessing the total social cost of reductions (which is equal to implementation and
transaction costs plus the costs borne by agents, less eventual fiscal revenues), as a
basis for choosing case-by-case between taxes or permits.
TPs, taxes and voluntary agreements
The analysis of the previous case studies showed differing ways of coexistence of
these instruments. 
In the US lead phase-down case the lead rights program was the unique instrument
used, however with variations in the trading and banking options.
In the Ecopoint case, the quota system coexists with the ongoing fuel tax, an incentive
to reduce fuel consumption and thus harmful emissions, and with the European
regulations on unit trucks emissions (EURO standards). As already mentioned, given
the importance of the Austrian route for European truck traffic, the Ecopoint system
has probably had a supplementary effect in accelerating the impact of the overall
EURO standard program.
In the European context, with regard to the general issue of fuel consumption, a
voluntary agreement (VA) of car makers coexists with the conventional fuel taxes.
They are both incentives on the supply side, on one hand, on the demand side, on the
other hand, to switch to cleaner cars. However VAs are often seen as a willingness by
the industry to escape from tighter regulation or tax, by realising part of the pollution
reduction: this is possible when the threat of the public authority is not credible,
especially when not backed by a strong public opinion as in the case for the GHG
issue (Bureau, 2000). The proposal for TPs on car makers aims at guaranteeing the









































Further, in the design of downstream permits on fuel consumption by the French
working group, TPs would coexist with current fuel taxes. In this framework fuel
taxes would keep their current status while TPs would specifically address the issue of
CO2 emission.
In the California ZEV case study, within the general credit framework, VA has been
established in 1996 with automakers agreeing to produce a certain number of electric
vehicles between 1998 and 2000. This VA played a specific role to solve temporarily
a difficulty in the ups and downs of the negotiation between CARB and the
automakers, pointing to the varying credibility of the public authority as mentioned
above.
These remarks show that coexistence is possible when needed and must be designed
pragmatically. 
In addition the case studies showed short term operation of TPs. Some TP schemes
may last only a few years, like the lead phase-down program with a duration of five
years from 1982 to 1987, or the Ecopoint system since 1992 until today under its
current configuration. This shows that TPs can be implemented and used within a
short range to ease and speed up a change in technology. However this does not mean
that TPs are confined to short term policy. The ZEV credit program is open since
1994 only but may last several years, even decades, depending on the level of market
diffusion of electric vehicles. Moreover, in relation to the very long term horizon of
the GHG issue, short term implementation of TPs addressing directly fuel
consumption of transport end users would result, as for the tax, in several behavioural
changes including reduction in trips or in VKT, modal shifts and land use patterns.
These changes, and especially the latter, have long term consequences on mobility
patterns. Maintaining these behavioural changes in the long term also implies keeping
continuous operation of related TP schemes in the long term.
Other unexplored possibilities
There has been little investigation of possible strategies relating to land use, perhaps
because transportation and urban planning sciences have not managed to clarify the
relationship between transportation and land use.  Yet the literature contains proposals
for applying marketable permits to real estate developers in terms of the travel
volumes that their projects will generate (see for example Ottensmann, 1998).  Such
investigation should also take into account the experiments with transferable urban
construction rights that have been launched in the United States in the beginning of
the 20
th century, as well as the environmentally significant initiatives undertaken
during the 1970s and 1980s in France and New Zealand.
Finally, there has been little attention to the supply side of infrastructure, except on
the part of local transportation authorities.  The scope of the behavioural changes
required suggests that governments should not rely solely on the adaptive capacity of
final transport users in terms of the current state of supply.  Major investments will
have to be made, particularly in rail infrastructure, at the same time as permits









































towards the real objective of reducing CO2 emissions by half, that permits might
become a significant source of funding for such infrastructure.
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